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CASE COMMENTS
CLASS ACTIONS: THE LAST NOTE OF THE DEATH KNELL A DISMAL SOUND FOR CLAIMANTS
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 98 S.Ct. 2454 (1978)*
After decertification of their lawsuit as a class action, plaintiffs, purchasers
of securities,' had claims which were individually too small to warrant the
expense of separate suits.2 Plaintiffs filed for appeal under the final judgment
rule, section 1291 of the United States Code3 which empowers appellate courts
to review all "final" decisions of district courts. 4 On the basis of the "death
knell doctrine," 5 the plaintiffs contended that the interlocutory order" deOEDITOR'S NOTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the fall 1978 term.
1. Plaintiffs, Cecil and Dorothy Livesay, were seeking to represent a class of 1,800 purchasers who, like themselves, had relied on deceptive financial statements in purchasing
securities from a Florida land development corporation. The defendant was the accounting
firm of Coopers & Lybrand, which had certified the allegedly misleading financial statements.
Plaintiffs' individual claim for damages was approximately $2,630. Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 2456 (1978).
2. In exercising its discretion, the Missouri district court concluded that the plaintiffs
were inadequate class representatives because they had unjustifiably delayed in prosecuting
their case and therefore had not effectively protected the interests in the class. Livesay v.
Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 1977). FED. R. Civ. P. 23 requires the
plaintiff to satisfy the following requirements to prosecute his suit as a class action: (1) the
class alleged must be so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable; (2)
there must be questions of law and fact common to the class; (3) the claims and defenses of
the named plaintiff must be typical of those of the class; (4) the named plaintiff and his
counsel must be able to protect fairly and adequately the interests of the class; (5) the questions of law and fact must predominate over those affecting individuals within the class; (6)
the class device must be superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy.
3. 28 U.S.C. §1291 (1970). Section 1291 provides: "The courts of appeals shall have
jurisidiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam,
and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court."
4. Though no uniform definition of finality has been accepted, a commonly acknowledged definition is that an order is final if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves only
the judgment to be executed. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). But see,
Hatzenbuhler v. Talbot, 132 F.2d 192, 193 (7th Cir. 1942) (finality attaches to an order which
is no longer open for reconsideration). See generally, Note, Finality of Decision for Purposes
of Appeal, 33 HARV. L. REV.1076, 1077-78 (1920).
5. The death knell doctrine states that an order denying class status is "final" for purposes of appeal under §1291 if the individual claim is so small that the plaintiff would not
proceed alone. However, if it is feasible for the plaintiff to pursue an individual suit, then
the order is interlocutory and thus unappealable. 98 S. Ct. at 2459. See text accompanying
notes 33-41 infra.
6. An interlocutory order is an order which is not a final disposition of the entire controversy. Simons v. Morris, 325 Ill. 199, 200, 156 N.E. 280 (1927). See generally 7A WRIGHT &
MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcrcE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL §1802 (1972).
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certifying their class action should be considered final under section 1291 because the order ended the suit for all practical purposes. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the district court order

did sound the death knell of the suit 7 and exercised jurisdiction to recertify
the plaintiffs' suit as a class action." The United States Supreme Court reversed

and HELD that an interlocutory order which effectively causes a plaintiff to
terminate a lawsuit before final judgment on the merits does not constitute a

final decision appealable pursuant to section 1291. 9
The final judgment rule underlying section 129110 originated in early

English common law"1 and was first adopted in the United States in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.12 Now codified in section 1291, the final judgment rule

is considered a cornerstone of federal appellate practice. 13 Paramount among
the policy considerations which account for the rule's long survival 14 is the

conservation of judicial resources. 15 In addition, the rule seeks to maintain an

appropriate relationship between appellate and trial courts, thereby avoiding
piecemeal litigation and the attendant delays and interruptions of trial. 16
7. The appellate court examined the amount of the plaintiff's individual claim, the plaintiff's financial status, and the probable cost of the suit in determining that the death knell
rule was applicable. Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (8th Cir. 1977).
8. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the record did not support the district
court's finding that plaintiffs had inordinately delayed prosecution. The record indicated that
much of the delay in the case was attributable to the defendant and the district court. Id. at
1112.
9. 98 S. Ct. at 2462. The Supreme Court also held that the collateral order doctrine was
not applicable to orders denying class certification. The doctrine states that an interlocutory
order may be considered final and appealable under §1291 if the order: (a) conclusively
determines the disputed question, (b) resolves an issue which is collateral or separate from
the merits of the suit and (c) is not effectively reversible on appeal from final judgment. Id.
at 2458. See text accompanying notes 28-29 infra.
10. The final judgment rule provides, in essence, that an appeal should lie only when the
challenged order has terminated the litigation at the trial stage. See note 3 supra.
11. See Metcalfe Case, 11 Co. 38a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1615). For historical background
of the final judgment rule, see generally Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41
YA.E L.J. 539 (1932).

12. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§21-22, 25, 1 Stat. 83-86.
13. See Di Belia v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962).
14. See Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. Rav. 351, 351-52 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Federal Appealability]; Note, Federal Appellate Review of the Grant or
Denial of Class Action Status, 18 B.C. INDus. & Com. L. REv. 101, 106-08 (1976).

15. This concern for judicial economy is of particular significance today in view of overcrowded dockets. See generally Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Court of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HAiv. L. REv. 542 (1969).

The final judgment rule increases the legal system's effectiveness by prohibiting the possibility of harrassment between the parties which would be present if interlocutory appeals

were of general use and by ensuring that the appellate court has an adequate record to
promote correct adjudication of the merits. See generally FederalAppealability, supra note 14,
at 551-53.

16. In the relationship between district and appellate courts the district court's primary
control of litigation should not be subject to constant intrusions which not only hamper
litigation, but also lessen the respect for the authority of district judges. Id. at 352. See also
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (appeals give a higher court
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Despite these laudatory purposes, strict adherence to the final judgment rule
occasionally led to inequitable results. 17 Consequently, both statutory and
judicial exceptions allowing prompt appellate review of interlocutory orders
were formulated to remedy these injustices.18
The oldest statutory exceptions to the final judgment rule, the extraordinary
remedies of the All Writs Act,' 9 granted the courts of appeal jurisdiction if a
district judge had abused his discretion or treated a litigant unfairly. Another
legislative exception to the finality requirement, rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 20 provided district courts with discretion to allow immediate
appeal from an order that finally determines one or more claims in a multipleclaim action.21 Section 1292(a)(1) 2 2 of the United States Code created additional
the power to review but not the power to intervene); Parkinson v. April Industries, Inc., 520
F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1975).
17. Inequities could only be alleviated if in certain situations the final judgment rule gave
way to other goals of appellate review such as: (I) providing appellate review when a party
would be irreparably harmed; (2) allowing appeal in order that appellate courts may supervise
a different or new area of law; (3) avoiding the waste of time, effort and money of the
parties and district courts by providing an opportunity to review before going through fruitless litigation to reach a final judgment. See Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts
Under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607, 609 (1975).
18. See notes 19-41 infra and accompanying text.
19. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651 (1970) (first enacted in 1789) provides: "The
Supreme Court and all courts established by Acts of Congress may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law." The extraordinary writs include writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari; however, federal courts no longer require a choice among the writs. Mandamus is the most commonly issued writ; relief sought under §1651 is often referred to as mandamus. See generally,
Note, The Writ of Mandamus: A Possible Answer to the Final Judgment Rule, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 1102 (1950); Comment, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under All Writs Act, 86
HARv. L. REv. 595 (1973); Comment, Collateral Orders and Extraordinary Writs as Exceptions
to the Finality Rule, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 746 (1957).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides: "When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."
21. The necessity for rule 54(b) arose when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with
their liberal provisions for joinder of additional claims and parties in a single controversy,
promised to increase the length and complexity of lawsuits. The drafters included rule 54(b)
as a method of alleviating any hardship for those parties whose rights were determined early
in the course of litigation and who could not afford to wait for the final judgment of the
complex suit. See Federal Appealability, supra note 14, at 357-63.
22. 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1) (1970) provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from: Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the United
States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District of Guam, and the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
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authority for interlocutory appeal by providing appellate courts with jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders granting or affecting injunctions.- The
primary statutory authority for interlocutory appeals, however, was section
1292(b),2 4 which empowered a federal trial court to allow an appeal from a
nonfinal order which involved a disputed and controlling question of law, the

resolution of which might significantly advance the termination of the litigation.25
In addition to the statutory exceptions to the final judgment rule, courts

have created exceptions which allow interlocutory appeals. The first judicial
exception to the final judgment rule was established in 1848 when the United
States Supreme Court held in Forgay v. Conrad- that orders resulting in ir2
reparable harm were final and appealableY.
In 1949, the Court in Cohen v.
28
Beneficial IndustrialLoan Corp. approved a second exception, the collateral
order doctrine,29 which deems final those orders ancillary and separable from

23. The basis of §1292(a)(1) can be traced to the fact that the common law requirement
of finality never developed in courts of equity. Accordingly, in American law, although the
Judiciary Act of 1789 established a finality requirement for all suits whether at law or equity,
Congress has made exceptions since 1841 for those interlocutory orders which traditionally
would have been issued in equity. See Crick, supra note 11, at 541-50.
24. 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) (1970) provides: "When a district judge, in making a civil action
an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such an
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of
Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if
application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That
application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless
the district judge of the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order."
25. Section 1292(b) was enacted by the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-508, §12(e), 72 Stat. 348. Commentators agree that §1292(b) was enacted as a result of dissatisfaction with §1291, §1292(a) and extraordinary writs as avenues of appellate review. See
generally Wright, The Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 23 F.R.D. 199 (1959); Note, Discre-

tionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders: A Guided Tour Through Section
1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 YALE.J. 333 (1959).
26. 47 U.S. 201 (1848).
27. In Forgay the Court held that an order immediately transferring real property to a
trustee in bankruptcy was final as a practical matter. The Court reasoned that such an order
created potential for irreparable harm, because an appeal subsequent to sale of the land
would not protect the rights of the party challenging the transfer. Id. at 203.
28. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The Cohen Court opined that an order which required plaintiff to
post a bond to cover litigation expenses was "final" because review following trial would be
useless to the defendant who had already financed his defense. Id. at 546-47.
29. The Court in Cohen created the "collateral order doctrine" when it described interlocutory decisions as being appealable if they "finally determine claims of right separable
from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and
too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until
the whole case is adjudicated. The Court has long given this provision [§1292] of the statute
this practical rather than a technical construction." Id. at 546. See also Dickinson v. Petroleum
Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950). For other applications of the Cohen rationale, see
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (order denying motion to reduce bail held appealable);
Swift & Co. v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 US, 684 (1950) (order vacating attachment held appealable).
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the merits. The Court formulated a third exception in 1964 in Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp.,3o designating as final all orders fundamental to the
further conduct of the case. In prescribing each exception, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the final judgment rule embodied in section 1291 must be
given a practical rather than technical construction.31
Following the Supreme Court's guidelines in Forgay, Cohen and Gillespie,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals created the death knell doctrine3 2 exception to section 1291 in the landmark case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.-3
In Eisen, the court determined that an order denying class action status which
sounded the "death knell" of the suit would be considered "final" and thus
appealable under section 1291.34 This doctrine purported to aid the plaintiff
who had a claim too small for individual litigation and whose class action suit
had been halted by a district court's denial of class status. The plaintiff could
then legally pursue his claim as an individual; however, since doing so would
not be economically feasible, the plaintiff would effectively be denied his day
in court 5 The death knell exception, with its unique class action application,
sought to prevent this injustice by allowing the plaintiff a right to appeal his
class status despite the absence of an actual final judgment on the merits.
30. 379 U.S. 148 (1964). In Gillespie a mother brought suit for the wrongful death of her
son on behalf of herself and a dependent brother and sister. A district court judge in dismissing two of the three claims consequently eliminated any further possibility of relief for
the brother and sister. The Court, stressing concern for irreparable harm to the rights of the
brother and sister, held the district judge's interlocutory order to be final as it was fundamental to further conduct of the case.
31. See note 29 supra.
32. See note 5 supra.
33. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (referred to as Eisen I).
This famous class action case involved allegations that two major odd-lot dealers on the New
York Stock Exchange violated the Sherman Act and that the Exchange had breached its
duties. Plaintiff sought immediate appeal from a district court order denying class standing.
The trial court in Eisen I agreed to allow appeal on the basis of the death knell doctrine,
despite the fact that no final judgment had been rendered. However, the Second Circuit in
Eisen II decided that the trial court had been hasty in denying class status and remanded with
instructions. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II). The district court subsequently determined
that the suit could be maintained as a class action and made an extreme effort to make the
suit work. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). However, the circuit court again reversed the lower
court decision, concluding that the district court had gone too far in trying to make the
action viable and that the case was unmanageable as a class action. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.
1973) (Eisen III). The case reached the Supreme Court on the plaintiff's appeal from Eisen III.
The Court agreed with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that the case could not proceed
as a class suit. The Supreme Court, however, confined its holding to the issue of notice costs,
and never reached the question of whether the Second Circuit's death knell doctrine approach
was correct. 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Eisen IV).
34. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the order denying class status
terminated or sounded the "death knell" of the suit since the plaintiff was left with an individual claim of only $70 and it would be impractical to pursue an individual suit. The court
noted that it might be assumed "that no lawyer of competence is going to undertake this
complex and costly case to recover $70 for Mrs. Eisen." 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
35. Comment, Class Actions in the Seventh Circuit: Appealability of an Interlocutory
Order Denying Class Status, 53 CHm.-KENT L. REv. 462, 473 (1976).
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Although the death knell doctrine provided valuable aid to class action
claimants,36 it was not unanimously endorsed by the federal circuit courts. 7
Even the seven circuits which accepted the doctrine 8 failed to agree upon a
uniform test for its application.39 In addition, when the doctrine was presented
to the Supreme Court for consideration, the Court, by confining holdings to
other issues, 40 or by denying certiorari,41 avoided ruling upon the validity of
the death knell exception.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict between the
circuit courts by rejecting the death knell doctrine. 42 The Court stressed the

36. The doctrine was seen as an aid to the fulfillment of the fundamental goals of class
action suits; promoting judicial efficiency; eliminating inconsistent decisions; and, most importantly, providing a vehicle for redress for small injuries to a large number of persons. See
Comment, FederalAppellate Review of the Grant or Denial of Class Action Status, 18 B.C.
INous. & Com. L. Rxv. 101, 101 (1976). The class action suit was first developed by equity
courts in their attempt to settle in a single lawsuit all of the aspects of a single controversy.
Although the class suit was adopted by various codes, until the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure the use of class actions was uncommon. The class action suit became
popular with the promulgation of FED. R. Clv. P. 23 in 1938. Class actions are often discussed and frequently used today under the 1966 revision of rule 23. See generally, F. JAMES
& G. HAZARD, Civir PRocEauE §10.18 (2d ed. 1977).
37. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the death knell rule in Hackett v.
General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972). See also Comment, Civil Procedure- Class Actions - Order Dismissing Class Action that Leaves Plaintiff
To Litigate a Small Monetary Claim Is Not a Final Appealable Order Under 28 US.C. §1291,
25 VAma.L. REv. 911 (1972); Samuel v. Univ. of Pitt., 506 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1974); Katz v.
Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 152 (1974). The Seventh
Circuit rejected the death knell doctrine in Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., 544 F.2d 1364 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 272 (1976). See generally Comment, supra note 35, at 462.
38. The following United States courts of appeals have accepted the Second Circuit's
death knell doctrine: OTT Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1975);
Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975); Monarch
Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975); Hartmann v.
Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973); Gosa v. Securities Investment Co., 449 F.2d 1330 (5th
Cir. 1971); Weingartner v. Union Oil Co. of California, 431 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971).
39. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a modified death knell doctrine in holding that the
plaintiff must establish in the district court record the nonviability of his individual claim.
Grad v. United States, 472 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973). The Ninth
Circuit has limited the application of the doctrine by holding that the plaintiff must show
not only that his own claim is impractical on an individual basis but that it is unlikely that
other members of the purported class have an individually viable claim. Hooley v. Red Carpet
Corp. of America, 549 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1977). The Second Circuit, unlike the other courts of
appeals, has gone so far as to allow the defendant's interlocutory appeal under §1291 from
orders granting class actions, creating in effect an "inverse death knell doctrine." Herbst v.
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974). But see Note, Class
Action CertificationOrders:An Argument for the Defendant's Right to Appeal, 42 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 621, 632-38 (1974).
40. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Eisen IV).
41. E.g., Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., 544 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
272 (1976) (Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell would have granted certiorari); Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
42. 98 S. Ct. at 2462.
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important policies underlying the finality requirement 43 and then decided that
the death knell doctrine, unlike established exceptions to the final judgment
rule, 44 undermined these policies. 45 The Court unanimously found the application of the doctrine arbitrary when based solely on the amount of the plaintiff's claim, 4 6 and too burdensome for the courts to administer when other
factors47were taken into consideration.48 In addition, the Court understood the
death knell doctrine to pose a continual threat of distruptions in the trial
process. Consequently, any benefit the doctrine may have offered to the quality
of justice was deemed outweighed by the strain it imposed upon the judicial
49
system's capacity to administer justice.
As an additional basis of decision, the instant Court suggested that the
doctrine, by providing for indiscriminate interlocutory appellate review, undermined the important policy of maintaining the appropriate relationship between the district and appellate courts." The need to maintain this relationship, the Court noted, was the reason Congress had required the consent of
first the district court and then the appellate court for a section 1292(b) interlocutory appeal.5 ' In short, the instant Court held that the death knell doctrine
provided an unacceptable basis for exercise of appellate jurisdiction under
section 1291.52
43. See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
44. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
45. 98 S. Ct. at 2459.
46. The Court stated that such an appealability rule based on the amount in controversy
would have been proper only if the legislature, and not the judiciary, created it. In performing its legislative duty, Congress had already chosen an appealability rule based on
finality. Id. at 2460. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 6, Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 98
S. Ct. 2454 (1978), which argued: "It is a source of mystery how an economic decision by
litigants or their counsel can confer finality on an order that is patently interlocutory."
47. A major criticism of the death knell doctrine was the lack of a specific uniform test
for determining when an appeal would be justified. Factors, in addition to the amount in
controversy, which courts of appeal considered important in determining the appealability of
the ruling included: (a) the potential cost of the suit; see e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d
291, 295 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); (b) the complexity of the suit; see,
e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971); (c) the plaintiff's financial
status; see, e.g., Weingartner v. Union Oil Co. of California, 431 F.2d 26, 28 (9th Cir. 1970);
(d) the size of individual claims of other members of the proposed class; see, e.g., Share v. Air
Properties, Inc., 538 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1976).
48. To properly determine if different factors rendered a plaintiff's claim inviable, a
sufficient record had to be established in the district court. This additional expense and delay
was multiplied if the district court record proved inadequate and had to be remanded for
further development. 98 S.Ct. at 2460. Cf. Brief for Petitioners at 21, Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 98 S.Ct. 2454 (1978), which stated: "In evaluating the legitimacy of the death knell
doctrine it is important to note that finality is not acquired by virtue of any court order but
rather by the voluntary decision of the plaintiff or more realistically his lawyer."
49. 98 S.Ct. at 2460. See generally Carrington, supra note 15.
50. See note 17 supra.
51. In enacting §1292(b), Congress, meeting the need for immediate review of nonfinal
decisions, was careful to provide appeal not as a matter of right but only in the discretion of
the district judge. The death knell doctrine ignored Congress' specific restrictions by allowing
appeals under §1291. 98 S.Ct. at 2461.
52. Id. at 2462. The Court, justifying its rejection of the death knell rule, also noted that
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A primary purpose of class actions is to make possible the pursuit of small
claims which are not economically feasible to assert individually. 53 Although
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempt to achieve this goal,54 no specific
provisions were included within the rules to allow interlocutory appeal of the
denial of class status55 even though such denial in most instances would be
fatal to the suit. Therefore potential class action representatives, though
uniquely situated, now can turn only to the traditional avenues of interlocutory
appeals.
The Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the validity of the death knell exception impacts adversely upon class claimants in that the established exceptions to the final judgment rule appear to be inadequate to meet their specific
needs. For example, application of section 1292(b) 56 to class actions presents
practical difficulties. The most obvious problem arises in obtaining certification
for appeal from the court which has just denied class status.57 Additionally,
uncertainty exists among the circuit courts as to whether section 1292(b) is a
proper vehicle for class status appeals in view of the formal section 1292(b)

requirements 58
Similarly, rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 which also
the doctrine was unfair because it operated only in favor of plaintiffs, although the appeal or
denial of class status is often crucial to defendants as well. Id.

53. See note 36 supra.
54. See note 2 supra.
55. The Supreme Court in the instant case recognized this predicament: "There are
special rules relating to class actions and, to that extent, they are a special kind of litigation.
Those rules do not, however, contain any unique provisions governing appeals." 98 S. Ct. at
2459. See generally, Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations,
70 COLUM. L. REv. 1292 (1970).
56. See note 25 supra.
57. Unfortunately, when a district judge fails to comply with the federal rules and an
appeal therefore is critical, §1292(b) certification is difficult to obtain from the trial judge. See
Interpace Corp. v. Philadelphia, 438 F.2d 401, 407 (3d Cir. 1971).
58. The Court in the instant case did not mention the significant conflict of authority as
to whether §1292(b) is a proper method to review a class action decision. The problem revolves around whether a class action meets the §1292(b) requirements that the order: (1)
involve a controlling question of law; (2) offer substantial grounds for difference of opinion
as to its correctness; and (5) if immediately appealed, materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. A major issue, in particular, has been the requirement of a controlling
question of law. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1123-24 (5th
Cir. 1969). But see, Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (court departed from the general rule and held a class action
order appealable under §1292(b) although there is no stated controlling question of law). In
view of these conflicts, a plaintiff cannot be certain that a judge will find that his class action
order meets the §1292(b) requirements. See also Note, supra note 55, at 1297.
The instant Court did recognize the burden imposed upon the plaintiff under §1292(b) and
emphasized that: "even if the District Judge certifies the order under §1292(b), the appellant
still has the burden of persuading the court of appeals that exceptional circumstances justify
a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after entry of a final
judgment." 98 S. Ct. at 2461.
59. See note 21 supra. Rule 54(b) has been applied to class actions orders. See Hayes v.
Sealtest Foods Div. of Nat'l Dairy Product Corp., 396 F.2d 448, 449 (3d Cir. 1968) (the court
treated the class action dismissal as a final determination of the claims presented for the non-
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requires the approval of the district court in directing the entry of a final judgment, raises the same practical difficulties raised by section 1292(b).60 A plaintiff
might alternatively attempt to employ the All Writs Act 61 to remove his case
from the district court; however, because a writ of mandamus traditionally has
been considered a drastic measure, the writ is rarely used.62 Section 1292(a)(1)63
presented another possible grounds of interlocutory appellate review where an
injunctive remedy was sought.6 4 However, the instant Court in a companion
case held section 1292(a)(1) inapplicable to class actions. 65
The class action plaintiff's final alternative, rule 41(b),66 allows a defendant
to move for a dismissal of the complaint if the plaintiff fails to respond to a
dismissal with leave to amend. 67 The dismissal, if granted, serves as a final
judgment which the plaintiff may appeal. This alternative method of appeal
is unsatisfactory, however, because the dismissal constitutes an adjudication on
the merits and thus requires that the plaintiff take an all or nothing gamble
that the district court order will be reversed. 68 Furthermore, rule 41(b) operates
only at the motion of the defendant, who may decide it is in his best interests
to prolong the ultimate determination of the class action.69
party members and thus allowed rule 65(b) appeal). Contra, Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496
F.2d 747, 752 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (rule 54(b) does not
permit the review of class certifications).
60. See FederalAppealability, supra note 14, at 357.
61. See note 19 supra.
62. For a discussion of the view that courts of appeals are reluctant to exercise the writs
because of their historical origin as a proceeding against the trial judge for improper conduct,
see Federal Appealability, supra note 14, at 375-78. Cf. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947)
(Court withheld applying the writ because it had the unfair consequence of making the
judge a litigant).
63. See note 23 supra.
64. Orders determining class status were previously appealed under §1292(a)(1) predominately in the civil rights area. See, e.g., Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 311 F.2d 107, 108
(4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963) (plaintiff sought an injunction on behalf of
himself and a class of others similarly situated against racial discrimination in the public
school system. The court held an order striking the class appealable under §1292(a)(1)).
Accord, Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1364-65 (1st Cir. 1972) (in an action to enjoin police
surveillance activities the striking of class allegations was a denial of broad injunctive relief
and therefore an appealable order).
65. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 98 S. Ct. 2451 (1978) (the Court unanimously held an order denying class certification not appealable under §12 92(a)(1)).
66. FED. R. Ctv. P. 41(b) provides that a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
or any claim against him if the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or
any order of the court. The rule states that unless the court specifies otherwise, the dismissal
acts as an adjudication on the merits.
67. If plaintiff does not respond to a dismissal with leave to amend or an order striking
his class action allegations, then the defendant may move to have the complaint dismissed for
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with court orders. See generally Note, supra
note 55, at 1298.
68. Because a rule 41(b) dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits, a plaintiff
takes the chance that he will be barred from ever prosecuting that claim in the future. This
method of appeal has been called "Federal Rules Roulette." See Note, supra note 55, at 1298.
69. This dependence upon defendant's cooperation makes rule 41(b) of questionable value
to plaintiffs. See Note, supra note 55, at 1298.
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CASE COMMENTS

In light of the dismal prospects facing a plaintiff attempting to utilize the
traditional modes of appeal, it is understandable that the courts sought to
establish a viable alternative.70 The resulting death knell doctrine, considered
by several courts to be a mere extension of the collateral order doctrine, 71 seemingly provided such an alternative. Because of problems in applying the death
Court was justified in concluding in the
knell doctrine, however, the Supreme
72
instant case that it was unworkable.
This decision to reject the death knell doctrine should have been expected.
The Court's growing displeasure with the small claim class action73 had been
evidenced by recent decisions imposing upon class action plaintiffs restrictive
jurisdiction 7 ' and prohibitive notification 5 requirements. This displeasure
manifested itself again in the instant decision, where the Court denied the only
potentially successful method of appeal70 to a plaintiff with a small claim. The
70. Though the judiciary may not be empowered to relieve the congestion in its courts
by declaring void many legislative acts, it can do so by revoking judicially developed remedies.
As Congress has failed to attend to the court system's plight, the Supreme Court resorted to
a kind of "self-help," perhaps with the hope that Congress would be forced to take the necessary measures to solve the consequential problem of any injustices to a small group of litigants
that the courts had originally attempted to handle. It can hardly be disputed that one of the
great attributes of our legal system is the flexibility with which the courts apply the law in
order to ensure that justice is done. Therefore, when the judiciary is faced with deficient
legislation it "experiments" with various cures. See generally Carrington, supra note 15, at
551-54.
71. The Court in the instant case held that an order determining class action status did
not fall within the collateral doctrine exception. See note 9 supra. The Court failed to mention that the death knell doctrine had been treated by some courts as an extension of the
collateral order doctrine rather than a separate doctrine. See, e.g., Graci v. United States, 472
F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973) (the death knell exception is considered part of the collateral order doctrine, which confers appealability on a small class of
interlocutory orders). See note 29 supra. See also Brief for Respondent at 23, Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 98 S. Ct. 2454 (1978), for the view that the death knell rule meets all the
requirements of the collateral order doctrine.
72. The Supreme Court refrained from commenting on the doctrine for ten years but at
the end of this period the circuits had not only failed to establish a uniform application of
the doctrine but had split as to the doctrine's validity. See text accompanying notes 37-39
supra. In addition, supporters of the doctrine were aware of its shortcomings. For example,
the Second Circuit, which developed the death knell doctrine, stated in a later opinion: "It
may be, as Judge Friendly indicates in his concurring opinion, that experience will show that
the 'death-knell' rule is not 'truly workable' and that we may have to formulate a different
Kom v. Franchard Corp., 443 F2d 1301, 1505 (2d Cir. 1971).
rule ....
73. See Note, supra note 39, at 634-36.
74. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). In Zahn, the Supreme Court
held that every member of a class must satisfy the applicable jurisdictional amount. Thus, in
a federal class action each member of the class must have a claim exceeding the $10,000 amount
in controversy requirement. Accord, Snyder v. Harris, 594 U.S. 332 (1969).
75. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Eisen held that it is a strict requirement of rule 23 that individual notice must be given to all identifiable members. The
notice must be delivered or mailed to each member of the class whose name and address can
be ascertained through reasonable effort. No matter how large the class or how great the
expense, mere publication or advertising does not satisfy due process. See also Oppenheimer
Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 98 S. Ct. 2380 (1978) (the Court held that the plaintiff seeking to represent a class suit must pay the cost of notice).
76. The Court's decision denying class claimants access to a §1292(a)(1) route of appeal
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Supreme Court accepted the fact that class action litigants as a whole might
suffer from its ruling, 7 but even after recognizing that the "quality of justice"
afforded to some plaintiffs may be forfeited, the Court unanimously found this
sacrifice justified.78 As in its previous class action decisions, the Court voiced
79
serious concern about the waste of judicial resources.
The decision in the instant case takes an ominous step toward the curtailment of such waste. The wording of the Court's holding 0 suggests that the
repercussions may extend far beyond any specific doctrine of class action litigation. Clearly, the holding is broader than required by the facts, in that it not
only abolishes the death knell doctrine, but also seriously threatens other
judicial doctrines which allow a plaintiff to appeal an interlocutory order that
otherwise would induce him to abandon his claim. It is reasonable to anticipate that the instant case may provide precedent for effective opposition to all
interlocutory appeals which are not expressly authorized by statute,8' thereby
reducing the great number of claims presently burdening the appellate courts.
At the very least, the decision may deter development of any new judicial doctrines favoring interlocutory appeals.
is also indicative of the Court's disfavor toward class actions. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 98 S. Ct. 2451 (1978).
77. For class action litigants the ultimate significance of the instant decision is that the
judiciary is no longer willing to aid these plaintiffs with their specific class problems. The
Court suggests that Congress is the appropriate body to balance the public policies of class
action appeals against the policies of the final judgment rule. When no judicial cure is found
and a high judicial cost is incurred, as in the instant case, the courts can only hope that
legislatures will come to their aid with stronger guidelines. In this manner the judiciary has
solved its problem by transferring the responsibility back to the legislature. See note 71 supra.
78. "[A]llowing an immediate appeal from those orders may enhance the quality of
justice afforded a few litigants. But this incremental benefit is outweighed by the impact of
such an individualized jurisdictional inquiry on the judicial system's overall capacity to administer justice." 98 S. Ct. at 2460.
79. In numerous footnotes the Court documented the considerable peril to the efficiency
of the entire appellate process generated by "ill founded applications"; the judicial process'
"momentum would be arrested." Id. at 2461 n.25, quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1667, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-6 (1958). Thus, the appellate court would become "entangled in the merits" in
deciding a collateral issue, id. at 2458 n.12, and the dockets would be vulnerable to "a flood
of petitions in inappropriate cases," id. at 2461 n.25, which would result in "the lost motion
of preparation, consideration, and rejection of unwarranted applications" and consequential
waste of time and money. Id. The courts below will still retain their powers of experimentation. The Court's inclusion of the word "sufficient" in its holding allows an escape from an
overly restrictive rule. The result is that the judge's discretion is reinstated where the "automatic" appeal is lost.
80. The specific holding of the Court was as follows: "Accordingly, we hold that the fact
that an interlocutory order may induce a party to abandon his claim before final judgment is
not a sufficient reason for considering it a 'final decision' within the meaning of §1291." Id.
at 2462.
81. The instant opinion's final footnote reinforces this implication. The Court distinguished its decision in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at 148, which had no
relation to class action appeals, from that reached in the instant case. The Court severely
limited this established exception to the final judgment rule when it determined that: "the
indiscriminate allowance of appeals from such discretionary orders is plainly inconsistent with
the policies promoted by §1292(b). If Gillespie were extended beyond the unique facts of that
case, §1291 would be stripped of all significance." 98 S. Ct. at 2462 n.30.
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